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 This project seeks to explore the realities of the emergency medical system in the Durban 
area, particularly relative to government policy. It contextualizes its findings within the literature 
on public policy. Data for the project was collected via nine in-depth interviews with various 
professionals working in the field of emergency medical services, as well as a survey of fourteen 
citizens conducted in the peri-urban township of Cato Manor. This data was analyzed using 
qualitative methods. While every participant had different views and a different perspective on 
emergency services, some recurring themes and trends became evident, allowing for conclusions 
to be drawn.  
The government-run emergency services in the Durban area do not measure up to the 
standards laid out by official government policy, often responding significantly slower than the 
national benchmark for response times. Many private ambulance companies have stepped into 
the gap in the market that this discrepancy creates, and are often significantly faster than the 
government services. This public-private dynamic fits an established model in policy literature of 
hybrid governance, in which third parties provide some of the services that the state would 
usually provide. However, despite official regulations, even private services also often deliver 
low-quality care to patients, particularly the smaller, so-called “fly-by-night” companies. There 
are many different possibilities as to how the state could improve the system, such as devoting 
more resources to the government service, further enforcing regulations, or creating a unified 
emergency call center. Unfortunately, none of these possibilities is without problems, and many 
participants were skeptical of whether any intervention could improve the system.	  
	 4	
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ..........................................................................................................................2 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................3 
Frequently Used Acronyms and Technical Terms ...........................................................................6 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................7 
Context and Literature Review ........................................................................................................9 
Context .................................................................................................................................9 
Current Policy ......................................................................................................................9 
Current Practice ................................................................................................................10 
The Road Accident Fund and Traffic Accidents ................................................................12 
Plans for Improvement .......................................................................................................13 
Methodologies ................................................................................................................................14 
Overview ............................................................................................................................14 
Sampling Plan ....................................................................................................................14 
Data Collection ..................................................................................................................15 
Data Analysis .....................................................................................................................16 
Ethics ..............................................................................................................................................18 
Findings .........................................................................................................................................19 
State of the Public Ambulance System ...............................................................................19 
Overview of the Private Ambulance System ......................................................................20 
“Fly-By-Night” Ambulance Companies ............................................................................21 
How Can We Improve? ......................................................................................................24 
Analysis..........................................................................................................................................27 
The State of the Durban Emergency Medical System ........................................................27 
The Hybrid Governance Model .........................................................................................30 
Moving Forward ................................................................................................................31 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................34 
Recommendations for Further Study .............................................................................................35 
References ......................................................................................................................................37 




Appendix 1: Sample Interview Guide ................................................................................41 
Appendix 2: Survey ............................................................................................................42 
Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance Form ................................................................................44 
Appendix 4: Consent to Use Form .....................................................................................45 
 	
	 6	
Frequently Used Acronyms and Technical Terms 
• EMS: Emergency Medical Services 
• EMRS: Emergency Medical Rescue Services, the government-run emergency service in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
• KZN: KwaZulu-Natal 
• NHI: National Health Insurance, the insurance system being implemented throughout 
South Africa  
• RAF: Road Accident Fund, a government-run fund that pays for some of the medical 
expenses for victims of traffic accidents 
• SAHRC: South African Human Rights Commission, a national institution created to 




“Fast like 9-1-1 in white neighborhoods” – J. Cole 
 Few people ever plan to need an ambulance. Indeed, one of the terrors of medical 
emergencies is that they are so unexpected, and could potentially strike at any moment. It is in 
these moments that the local emergency medical service, which might otherwise rarely cross 
one’s mind, becomes critical. However, during apartheid, South Africa’s emergency medical 
system barely served large swaths of the population, namely nonwhites. In fact, in some parts of 
the country, no ambulance service existed at all (Macfarlane, Van Loggerenberg, & Kloeck, 
2004, p. 146). Where services did exist, care was sharply divided along racial lines; ambulances 
were designated to carry either white or nonwhite patients, a rule that was “enforced even when 
an ambulance of the ‘wrong’ colour was within reach” and could save the patient’s life. 
Although whites received better care in general, this rule ironically had the potential of affecting 
all races adversely, as in the case of a Mr. Jenkins, a white man who was stabbed by his wife in a 
coloured township. Because the paramedics had assumed he was coloured when they got the call, 
they brought a coloured ambulance and were thus unable to take him. Mr. Jenkins reached the 
hospital hours later and died shortly after arrival (Bell, 2006, p. 67). 
 The system has changed significantly since the end of apartheid in 1994. For one, 
enforced inequality in emergency care is no longer government policy. In its place is the African 
National Congress’s 1994 promise that “all communities must have access to emergency 
services,” regardless of race (African National Congress, 1994, p. 35). The 1996 Constitution 
then codified this promise into law, stating that “no one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment,” and that everyone has the right of access to health care services (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 27). However, the system has also evolved in 
other ways since apartheid’s end; the shift has been partially characterized by the emergence of a 
robust for-profit private ambulance industry. This emergence includes the two biggest players in 
the business, Netcare911 and ER24, which were founded in 1998 and 2000, respectively, but 
also dozens of smaller companies (Mediclinic, 2016, n.p; Netcare Group, 2016, n.p.).  
 Of course, a transformation in the system is different from actually creating a functional 
ambulance service, and to this day emergency medical services (EMS) in South Africa are 
widely perceived to be desperately in need of improvement. This negative perception is 
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particularly present regarding the government-run service, which is plagued by long response 
times seen by some as unacceptable. For example, in 2007, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) reported that the public ambulance service “for some hospitals is at best 
inadequate and at worst non-existent” (SAHRC, 2007, p. 42). However, it is also true of private 
ambulance services. Although these services are mainly intended for patients with medical aid, 
they can also be inadequate and are sometimes accused of delivering low-quality care to patients. 
Given these glaring issues, I plan to explore the state of public and private EMS in 
Durban and the surrounding area, particularly relative to government policy, and discuss ways in 
which these services could potentially be improved in the coming years, situating my findings 
within the relevant policy literature. 
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Context and Literature Review 
Context 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) is the second largest province in South Africa with over 11 
million people, making up nearly 20% of the country’s total population (Statistics South Africa, 
2016, p. 2). It sits in the southeast corner of the country on the Indian Ocean, and its largest city 
is Durban. The population of Durban is about 3.2 million. 68% of its residents are black, 20% are 
Indian, 9% are white, and the remaining 3% are coloured (KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health 
“Durban Metro”, n.d., n.p.). In the Durban area, as in the rest of KZN, Zulu is the primary 
language of black South Africans.  
I conducted the survey portion of this research in Cato Manor, a peri-urban community of 
about 70,000 people located seven kilometers outside of Durban (Laurence, 2014, p. 7). A 
majority Indian area pre-apartheid, Cato Manor is now predominantly black and is plagued by 
many social and economic ills such as unemployment and poverty. These ills are not exclusive to 
Cato Manor, as they plague many townships—often-underdeveloped areas outside South African 
cities that were usually zoned for nonwhites during apartheid and remain largely nonwhite (Beall 
and Todes, 2004, p. 305; Pernegger and Godehart, 2007, p. 2). Although I was unable to find 
exact statistics on medical aid coverage in Cato Manor itself, Statistics South Africa in its 2015 
General Household Survey estimated that only 11.9% of KZN’s population has medical aid, and 
only 7.7% of the province’s black population (p. 110). These numbers give some estimate of the 
medical aid coverage within this community. 
 
Current Policy 
On the basis of sweeping, idealistic documents including but not limited to the 
Constitution and the African National Congress’s National Health Plan, emergency medical care 
is now available to anyone in South Africa who calls the toll-free emergency number 
(Macfarlane et al., 2004, p. 146). Each province runs its own public EMS, which in KZN is the 
Emergency Medical Rescue Services—EMRS (Ashokcoomar, 2012, p. 6). In addition to the 
government services, private ambulances from companies such as ER24 and Netcare911 are 
available to those who call their respective numbers.  
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Although running the public ambulance services is on a province-by-province basis, 
some Department-of-Health-specified national standards guide the goals and benchmarks for the 
quality of public emergency care. Notably, these standards suggest that there should be one 
ambulance for every 10,000 citizens. In addition, they recommend ten EMS staff members per 
ambulance, and two staff members per ambulance per shift (SAHRC, 2015, p. 27).1 The national 
standards for ambulance response times are 15 minutes in urban areas and 40 minutes in rural 
areas. In order to be compliant, provincial services must respond within these time frames in at 
least 80% of the cases (SAHRC, 2015, p. 58).  
Each provincial government also has the responsibility of regulating private ambulance 
companies, in accordance with national policy guidelines passed in 2015. According to the 
regulations, each private service must apply to the provincial Department of Health for a license 
to practice before beginning to operate and must renew the license annually (Department of 
Health, 2015a, p. 31). During this licensing process, the province must inspect the service and 
verify compliance with certain minimum standards, such as having a manager with at least 
Intermediate Life Support qualification, having a 24-hour base, and having appropriate vehicle 
washing facilities with the requisite medical waste traps, among others (Department of Health, 
2015a, p. 10). These regulations are at least partially based on policies that the Western Cape has 
had in place since 2010, which have similar inspection and licensing requirements (Western 
Cape Department of Health, 2010, p. 3).  
 
Current Practice 
While this may all seem like sound policy upon the first read, the reality is unfortunately 
quite different. Perhaps the most apparent difference between policy and practice is in public 
ambulance response times. In 2004 Macfarlane et al. declared that no ambulance service outside 
of Johannesburg “manages to achieve [the 15/40 minute standard] with some degree of regularity” 
(p. 147). The situation seems to have worsened since then, even in Johannesburg, where 
ambulances now only respond to 54% of calls within the requisite 15 minutes (Mkize, 2016, 
																																																								
1 While the standard of one ambulance per every 10,000 citizens is cited frequently in the observed 
literature and interviews, the original document itself could not be found. The South African Human 
Rights Commission reported similar difficulty in finding the actual document, saying that they requested 
it from the Eastern Cape Health Department but never obtained it, and that the standards could not be 
obtained through outside research (2015, 27). 
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n.p.). In Durban, EMRS paramedics report that they can take hours to get to emergency calls. As 
one anonymous paramedic said, “Sometimes we get to the emergencies and the person has 
already died. More often than not, we arrive at the scene to find that the people who have called 
are so fed up that they have bundled the patient into a car and rushed them to the hospital” 
(Wicks and Hlongwane, 2013, n.p.). This description is consistent with the SAHRC’s report on 
government EMS in the Eastern Cape, which claimed that a wait time of 10-14 hours was 
standard there (SAHRC, 2015, p. 59). In the most extreme cases, wait time can be upwards of a 
day. For instance, the same SAHRC report told of the case of a critically ill child whose parents 
called the emergency number. The operator told them that an ambulance was on its way but first 
had to be filled up with petrol; the ambulance ended up arriving 29 hours later, after the child 
passed away (SAHRC, 2015, p. 59). While this report was specific to the Eastern Cape, it is 
reasonable to believe that the situation in KZN may be similar. These response times are of 
particular concern when viewed in light of the so-called Golden Hour, a principle of emergency 
medicine which states that “the sooner trauma patients reach definitive care the better their 
chance for survival” (Eisele, 2008, n.p.). Thus, with each passing minute or hour that ambulances 
do not come, the patient’s chances of survival decrease. 
At the root of these slow response times, among other factors, is a shortage of 
ambulances. For KZN to meet the standard of one ambulance per 10,000 people, it would need 
over 1,000 ambulances. It has 212, drastically fewer than the target number (Wicks and 
Hlongwane, 2013, n.p.). Without enough ambulances to process requests, it is easy to see how 
paramedics and emergency workers find themselves in situations where they simply cannot 
promptly respond to all the calls they receive, resulting in long wait times for patients. 
Other issues contribute to the less than ideal quality of government-provided pre-hospital 
care. Also near the top of the list of complaints is the absence of equipment within the 
ambulances, as the SAHRC found that many in the Eastern Cape reported a consistent lack of 
oxygen and regulators. In some cases, ambulances were found to be completely bare inside, with 
no equipment at all (SAHRC, 2015, p. 52). Within Durban EMRS, literature reports less extreme 
but still serious issues, such as leaky oxygen valves, broken flow meters, and missing door 
panels (Tapper, 2011, p. 22). Naturally, with deficient or nonexistent equipment, providing 
acceptable levels of care becomes more difficult, at times impossible.  
	 12	
It is important to note that the problems described above are all concerning public 
ambulance services. As one might expect, private services are generally much faster, with ER24 
reporting an average response time of 22 minutes in Durban (Wicks and Hlongwane, 2013, n.p.). 
However, even private EMS is not without problems. Although there is a dearth of formal 
literature on the topic, several news articles from recent years tell of issues with so-called “fly-
by-night” ambulance companies in the Durban area. These companies are different from larger 
providers, not solely because of their size, but also due to a lack of institutional backing. For 
example, ER24 is owned by Mediclinic and Netcare911 is owned by Netcare Group, both large 
corporate health care providers (Mediclinic, 2016, n.p; Netcare Group, 2016, n.p.). Conversely, 
“fly-by-night” providers might be as small as one ambulance and be owned by the ambulance’s 
paramedic. In addition, sometimes they are unlicensed or employ medics without the requisite 
training (Dorasamy, 2014, n.p.).  
 
The Road Accident Fund and Traffic Accidents 
 According to the sparse literature, these small companies make some money off medical 
aid schemes but also heavily rely on the government-run Road Accident Fund, or RAF 
(Waterworth, 2016, n.p.). The RAF is a fund established by the 1996 Road Accident Fund Act, 
designed to financially compensate “for damage wrongfully caused by the driving of motor 
vehicles” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 3). Notably, this includes paying 
for any medical costs incurred as a result of injuries caused by an accident. It also specifically 
includes paying for emergency medical services, as the Act says that these costs will be covered 
and “negotiated between the Fund and health care providers, and shall be reasonable taking into 
account factors such as the cost of such treatment and the ability of the Fund to pay” (Parliament 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, p. 10). In practice, this payment system seems to function 
fairly effectively; one major accident claim law firm’s website advises that “you have a claim for 
medical expenses and that is normally quite simple: you keep a record of all accounts that are 
related to the accident and your attorney claims them back from the Road Accident Fund” (De 
Broglio Attorneys, 2015, n.p.). Other websites on this topic had similar advice (Western Cape 
Government, 2015, n.p.). In other words, if a private ambulance company bills a patient for 
transport from an accident scene to the hospital, the patient can just refer the bill to the RAF and 
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the Fund will pay, even if the patient does not have medical aid and would not otherwise have 
been able to pay. 
Looking for payouts from this fund, the aforementioned smaller ambulance services 
reportedly often race to ambulance scenes and load as many patients as they can into the 
ambulance, not always providing them with the proper treatment along the way. Then, they drop 
everyone off at the hospital and collect payment from medical aid schemes or the RAF for each 
of the patients treated (Waterworth, 2016, n.p.). 
 
Plans for Improvement 
To its credit, the government is making efforts to change the system and improve 
emergency medical care. In the short term, the KZN Department of Health has prioritized 
purchasing new ambulances and repairing faulty ambulances faster, as to have a larger available 
fleet at any given time. It has also committed to increasing efficiency through consolidation of 
communication centers, improved triage, and improved routing of patients, all of which could 
potentially lead to improved response times (KZN Department of Health, 2015, p. 149). 
However, articulating these plans is entirely different from actually implementing them; a quick 
glance at the department’s goals from the previous year concerning ambulance care reveals that a 
majority of these goals were never realized (KZN Department of Health, 2015, p. 146).  
Longer-term changes to the emergency medical system primarily revolve around the 
National Health Insurance plan (NHI), which will overhaul the country’s entire medical system 
over the upcoming decades. According to the White Paper on the NHI, the government will 
“contract with accredited providers of EMS in the public and private sectors” in an effort to 
provide “a uniform level of quality for EMS across the country” (Department of Health, 2015b, p. 
44). Although the White Paper itself does not explicitly mention improving ambulance response 
times or regulating fly-by-night companies, it does lay out some specific measures on how to 
provide this uniform level of care, such as a single call center for both public and private services 
and mandating that all ambulances have the same colors on the outside (Department of Health, 





I lived and researched in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal throughout the duration of this study. 
When collecting data from professionals in the EMS field, the primary method employed was 
semi-structured interviews. When collecting data in Cato Manor, the primary method was a two-
page survey. I also used secondary sources to help gain a greater understanding of the situation 
regarding EMS in Durban and contextualize it within the relevant policy literature.  
 
Sampling Plan 
In order to learn more about the issues plaguing EMS in the area and how the government 
can improve the service, I spent the first phase of the study attempting to talk to as many 
professionals in the industry as possible. This process primarily consisted of calling various 
ambulance services or arriving at their base unannounced and asking to set up an interview with 
anyone who was willing. In other words, sampling was largely based on whom I could 
successfully contact and who would speak with me. Snowball sampling also played a key role in 
this process, as many interviewees had suggestions of other bases that I could visit or other EMS 
professionals who might be willing to talk. In the second phase of the study, I primarily intended 
to explore the relationship between the ambulance services and the poorer township communities 
outside Durban. For two months prior to the study, I lived with a family in the Masxha 
neighborhood of Cato Manor. Because of Cato Manor’s status as economically disadvantaged 
and my status as a quasi-community member, Masxha was an ideal place to conduct this portion 
of the study. During this phase, I used snowball sampling and contacts from my stay to survey as 
many willing community members as possible about their experience with ambulance services 
and whom they would call if they had an emergency. 
In total, I interviewed seven EMS professionals working for private companies, one 
trauma nurse working in a government hospital, and one journalist. I also administered a survey 
to fourteen members of the Cato Manor community. 
 One important limiting factor to this sampling plan is the difficulty I had in accessing 
government employees. When attempting to contact government EMS employees for interviews, 
I repeatedly was directed to a formal research application process for all projects conducted 
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within the KZN Department of Health, which unfortunately was not practical or realistic given 
the time constraints on the project. Conversely, private companies and their employees were 
generally happy to accommodate me. Because of this, almost all of the interviews were with 
people working in the private EMS industry, which has potential to bias the results.  
 Within the private sector, employees of larger companies such as ER24 or Citimed were 
far more accessible than those working for smaller companies. This disparity is because the large 
companies generally have up-to-date websites and publicly available data on locations of their 
bases. Conversely, some of the smallest services either do not have websites or listed phone 
numbers that were no longer in service. Because of this, I mostly spoke to employees of larger 
companies. Even within the category of smaller companies, I suspect that the services readily 
available via the Internet tend to lean towards the more legitimate and higher-quality end of the 
spectrum, leaving me unable to contact the truly small and informal services. These issues again 
have the potential to bias the data, as those working for large companies have very different 
perspectives on the question of regulation than those working for small companies, and more 
legitimate smaller companies may also have different perspectives than the smallest and least 
formal services. 
 Another important limit on these methodologies was the narrow nature of the survey. 
Although it was intended to assess the relationships between the townships around Durban and 
local EMS, particularly smaller private companies, the survey results in reality only give data on 
the experiences and opinions of fourteen members of one small neighborhood of one particular 
township. Other communities, both within Cato Manor and within the many different Durban-
area townships, may have very different relationships with emergency services, and therefore the 
survey results cannot be seen as representative of the entire Durban area. 
All aforementioned limitations should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from 
the data.  
 
Data Collection 
 Among the participants in the EMS industry, interviews took place in a number of 
locations, such as the participant’s EMS base or a local coffee shop. Because the interviews were 
semi-structured, I prepared a set of questions to help guide the conversation. Although these 
questions varied somewhat interview-to-interview based on the specific characteristics of each 
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interviewee, they followed the same themes and issues. A sample interview guide can be found 
in Appendix 1. It should also be noted that I would ask follow-up questions and adjust lines of 
questioning mid-interview based on the flow of the conversation, and thus did not follow the 
prepared interview guides exactly. I recorded each interview on my cell phone with the 
interviewee’s permission. 
 Before the first three interviews, I asked whether the interviewee would like to remain 
anonymous or if I could use his or her name. However, this question seemed to make people 
slightly uncomfortable, which may then have affected the tone of the interview. In order to avoid 
this issue for the rest of my interviews, I decided to keep all participants completely anonymous 
and remove all unique identifiers. After these initial three interviews, I informed all participants 
that they would be kept anonymous before the conversation began. 
 Among those surveyed in Cato Manor, surveys were generally administered in the 
participants’ homes, as this was the most convenient location. Participants were given the option 
of either filling out the survey on their own or having me talk them through the questions 
individually. Because many participants struggled with reading and writing English, they often 
chose the latter option. When participants did not understand one of the questions, I explained it 
to them in different words. The survey administered can be found in Appendix 2. It should also 
be noted that I told all Cato Manor participants that their identities would be kept anonymous 
before beginning the survey. 
 I collected data from secondary sources via searches through various databases, such as 
Google Scholar, JStor, and PubMed. I also gathered gray literature through searches on Google’s 
main search engine and found secondary sources via recommendations from various academic 
advisors, both formal and informal. 
 
Data Analysis 
 I analyzed the data using qualitative methods. With respect to the interview recordings, I 
first listened to the interview straight through without interruption and then listened through a 
second time in order to transcribe the conversation. Transcription, when done carefully, has been 
established to be an important part of the reflection process during qualitative research, and can 
assist in meaning-making after many extensive in-depth interviews (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 
2005, p. 14). With this literature in mind, I then spent substantial time after the transcription 
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process reading over all the transcripts and surveys and identifying different themes and 
arguments that repeatedly occurred, as part of the process of triangulation. With respect to the 
survey results, I read through all the responses twice and took notes on interesting responses. I 
was particularly interested in participants’ experiences with different ambulance services in the 
past and whom they said they would call if they had an emergency today.  
I also viewed all of this data through the lens of various literature sources on public 
policy and policy implementation, in order to give the data analysis a stronger theoretical basis 




 Owing to the nature of this study relying on interviewees sharing their personal opinions 
about the nature of their work, which in some cases needed to remain confidential, the research 
was first subject to review by a Local Review Board. The Review Board examined the project 
for ethical concerns and approved it (see Appendix 3). The research also complied with SIT 
Study Abroad’s Statement of Ethics and Human Subjects Research Policy. All participants were 
asked to read and sign an informed consent form before conducting an interview or taking the 
survey. In addition, I asked all interviewees for their permission to record the conversation.   
 When interviewing EMS employees and experts, the primary ethical concern was that 
participants could face negative repercussions for the content of their interviews, from employers 
or even friends. For example, several participants who work for private ambulance companies 
repeatedly clarified that they were only stating their personal views, rather than the official 
positions of their employers. This issue, however, was resolved via the decision to keep all 
participants anonymous and remove all unique identifiers. Although some characteristics of each 
participant are included, such as their job title and in some cases what company employs them, I 
carefully considered which facts to reveal as to give the reader the necessary context without 
compromising anonymity. In addition, all interview recordings and transcripts are kept on my 
password-protected devices and thus cannot be accessed by anyone else. 
One advantage of the nature of the interviews and surveys was that they placed me in the 
position of a learner, with the participants explaining aspects of the system to me. This 
relationship assisted in altering traditional power dynamics in which a researcher has 
significantly more power than a participant (Glense, 2006, p. 94). Throughout my research, 
especially in Cato Manor, I was particularly conscious of these power dynamics and ethical 





State of the Public Ambulance System 
 Participants almost universally painted a bleak picture of public ambulance services in 
the Durban area, particularly honing in on the issue of response times. As Participant 1, a 
paramedic for ER24, said of the government services, “They’re flooded every single day” (2016). 
When asked how long EMRS’s response time would be, from the moment an emergency call 
was placed to the moment the ambulance arrived, Participant 1 estimated that the government 
services “average between one to two hours in the city” (2016). While responses to this question 
varied somewhat and no participants knew the exact statistics, they generally agreed with this 
time range. 
However, even this wait is short compared to what participants felt may face those in 
townships needing an ambulance. When asked about township EMRS response times, 
Participant 1 upped his estimate to three or four hours, and Participant 2, an owner of a small 
township-based ambulance company, suggested that a patient might have to wait “a day or so” 
(2016). Citizens of Cato Manor, when asked how long EMRS took the last time they called for a 
public ambulance, reported a range consistent with these estimates; while some claimed waits as 
short as 30 minutes or an hour, four of the eight Cato Manor citizens who had called EMRS in 
the past reported that the ambulance simply never came and that they had to get to the hospital 
through other means. This poor service led to a sharp dislike of EMRS among some members of 
the Cato Manor community, including Participant 3, who said, “We don't trust them” (2016). She 
also claimed that she would not call an ambulance at all if she had an emergency, and would 
instead ask a neighbor or friend for a ride (Participant 3, 2016). 
While response time dominated the discussion of EMRS, it was not the only problem that 
participants identified with the government service. Several Cato Manor citizens also complained 
about the attitude of EMRS personnel, who Participant 4 claimed “don’t have respect and 
sometimes don’t take things seriously,” noting the time that the EMRS paramedics told her that 
her sick, elderly neighbor was going to die soon anyhow (2016). In addition to response times 
and staff attitudes, Participant 5, a journalist with experience working in and writing about EMS, 
claimed that lack of adequate equipment and resources was a major issue. As he said, “You have 
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these massive fleets of public ambulances where the equipment is just disgusting. It’s a massive 
breakdown of the public health care system” (2016). 
 While the participants did not view the government services described above as perfect or 
even satisfactory, they often pointed out that the services are affordable and even free, as 
opposed to the private companies, which are mainly intended for those who can pay or have 
medical aid. The responses of those in Cato Manor demonstrated the critical importance of cost; 
even though they described all of the above problems, nine of the twelve Cato Manor 
participants without medical aid reported that they would still call EMRS the next time that they 
had an emergency. When asked why, the answer was the same every time: they could not afford 
anything else. 
 
Overview of the Private Ambulance System 
 In addition to EMRS, the Durban area has what Participant 1 estimated to be thirty-nine 
or forty private ambulance services (2016). Every participant familiar with the private services 
reported times far faster than what EMRS is capable of providing. Participants 1 and 6, both 
employees of ER24, reported their average response time to be fifteen minutes (2016). 
Participant 7, a paramedic for Citimed Ambulance, also reported fifteen minutes as their average 
(2016). Participant 8, a paramedic for a small ambulance company in a Durban suburb, claimed 
that they usually arrived within ten to fifteen minutes (2016). Finally, Participant 2, the owner of 
the small township-based company, also claimed around ten to fifteen minutes on average for his 
service (2016).  
However, some disputed the extent to which these response times were accurate for the 
entire population or whether they were only a reality for those with medical aid. As Participant 5, 
the journalist, said:  
With a company like Netcare, you’re going to call, and it goes to a national emergency control 
room where all the calls are recorded. They know that they can’t refuse care, but it’s kind of like 
an unwritten rule that they’ll sometimes say they have no ambulances available [if the caller says 
that they do not have medical aid.] – Participant 5, 2016 
 
He felt that this was also true for smaller companies with a less formal infrastructure, where 
people “get told an ambulance isn’t available, but you see them sitting under the trees” (2016). 
Indeed, when I asked Participant 7 if having medical aid or not affected the speed with which 
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other private ambulance companies got to the patient, he merely laughed before saying that he 
could not talk badly about other services (2016).  
 
“Fly-By-Night” Ambulance Companies 
Interestingly, despite the well-documented issues with public sector ambulances, many 
participants felt that the single biggest problem plaguing EMS in the area was the number of 
small “fly-by-night” services, which Participant 7 reported were “mushrooming up everywhere” 
(2016). Participant 5 explained the cause behind the rise of these companies: 
People realized that they could make a lot of money off of it. If you look at all of these smaller 
private services, they’re just offshoots of one another. So you had guys who used to work for 
Netcare and then went on their own. You can make millions! So they realized that if you did even 
a fraction of the billable calls of Netcare you could make a tidy profit for yourself. Their staff 
then realized, ‘Oh, this guy drives a [sports car] and we only have eight ambulances’ so they 
break off and do their own thing. – Participant 5, 2016 
 
Some participants explained that although these companies do not have the name or 
brand recognition of larger companies like Netcare911 or ER24, and thus may not receive the 
same quantity of calls, they make money through other means. Some of their business comes 
from being forwarded calls from the provincial service and large private services; Participants 2 
and 8, both of whom are affiliated with small community-based companies, both mentioned 
being forwarded calls by EMRS, ER24, and Netcare911 when the larger services felt that they 
would not be able to get to a call in time (2016). I also saw this occur first-hand, as Participant 2 
got a call from a friend in EMRS in the middle of our interview asking if he could assist with an 
emergency call.2 
However, participants also explained that most of small services’ business comes via 
other, often less legitimate means. Small companies are often first to the scene of traffic 
accidents after hearing about them on the radio or from paid contacts in the tow truck industry 
(Participant 1, 2016). In fact, several participants reported that a car crash in Durban could draw 
many of these small ambulance companies to the scene; Participant 1 said that he would estimate 
																																																								
2 Interestingly, although this semiformal coordination between services does occur to some extent, it does 
not appear to be widespread enough to have a meaningful effect on overall EMRS response times, as 
Participants 2 and 8 said that the coordination was not a significant portion of the business of their small 
companies (2016). In addition, no Cato Manor residents referenced calling the government number and 
being treated by a private ambulance that had been sent in its place. Thus, while this topic is potentially 
very interesting, participants did not seem to feel as if it had a large impact on EMRS response times or 
private sector business, so I chose not to discuss it at length in this paper. 
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the average would be as “eight ambulances or even more” (2016). When asked why so many 
ambulances would arrive at one traffic accident even though those in townships and other areas 
had to wait so long for any service to come, participants usually cited the RAF. Because the 
Fund pays the medical costs of accident victims, even if patients do not have medical aid the 
ambulance service will still be paid for the transport, making a crash site a lucrative opportunity 
(Participant 7, 2016). In fact, these accidents are so important to the smaller services that, 
according to Participant 1, “If the Road Accident Fund had to close down, you’d find that all of 
these [small] services would shut down… Accidents are where their money is. They’ll very 
seldom go to medical calls” (2016).  
 Participants reported that this system creates problems; because the RAF or medical aid 
pay companies a certain amount for each patient transported to the hospital, this system 
incentivizes quantity of patients instead of quality of care. One problem repeatedly mentioned is 
that rather than working together to treat patients, these small services often compete with each 
other for patients, even fighting as people lie injured. Participant 5 explained below: 
The competition is stiff. Like, fighting over people at accident scenes. Literally, fistfights! 
Literally, assault charges against each other. ‘Ambulance Wars’ is a perfect headline for that 
because they literally fight with each other for patients. Because it’s money. The very least you’re 
going to get out of a patient, one patient, one green code, minor, walking wounded patient is 
R3000. Why wouldn’t you do that? – Participant 5, 2016 
 
 Once the patients actually enter the care of the services, participants reported that the 
situation does not improve. Reportedly, medics might load “ten or twelve” patients into the 
ambulance at a time, knowing that medical aid or the RAF will pay for each patient transported 
(Participant 6, 2016). These patients might be loaded into an ambulance even if moving them is 
potentially harmful to their health, as Participant 7 told of companies “taking patients with a 
spinal injury and not giving them any head support, anything,” among other issues (2016). As 
bad as this sounds, the patients loaded into the ambulance quickly are actually the lucky ones, as 
services will reportedly “leave the critically injured patient that’s going to take up all the 
resources,” knowing that they will make less money if they take one patient who requires a lot of 
attention versus if they take ten who require very little (Participant 5, 2016).   
 Not all participants agreed with this harsh assessment of smaller ambulance companies. 
Notably, Participant 2 defended his small company and claimed that smaller services were 
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important within townships and poorer communities that cannot afford to be treated by one of 
the larger companies. As he said: 
So the reason [my company] was established was because of the need that we saw within our 
community, because our community could not afford the big ambulance services. They have a set 
rate that they charge according to because they are a big organization. So what we try to say is, 
‘This is our community, we live in our community, we understand that they do not have money, 
but we cannot deprive them of medical assistance.’ We are way cheaper than ER24 because, for 
one call to a township, ER24 might charge R2000. And we can do it for R500. Or R300. Or even 
for free, because for us the cost isn’t as much as it is for ER24… You can take a drive, any 
township of your choice. Drive the entire township and tell me if you see an ER24 ambulance. 
You choose the place! And tell me if you can see a Netcare or ER24 ambulance. You won’t see 
them, but you will see the smaller services because they’re within those communities. – 
Participant 2, 2016 
 
While he admitted that “maybe [larger companies] have more advanced equipment,” than 
his service, Participant 2 insisted, “We have what is needed” (2016). He also argued that stories 
of poor quality of care by smaller companies are overblown and that while “everyone makes 
mistakes,” big ambulance medics had a tendency of going to the media with stories exaggerating 
the poor quality of smaller services. He attributed this behavior to the fact that the large 
companies are “feeling the pain” of competition (2016).  
Participant 2’s interview was inconsistent with other interviews; while he insisted that 
smaller services were critical to townships and poorer communities, other interviewees disagreed. 
Among the dissenters was Participant 5, the journalist, who claimed that this argument was 
“complete bullshit” and that small services were in fact generally less likely than their larger 
counterparts to pick up poorer patients (2016). In an attempt to reconcile these different stories, I 
asked community members in Masxha their opinions on various ambulance companies and 
whom they would call in an emergency. Tellingly, none of the fourteen Masxha participants 
named a small service when asked what ambulance services they had called in the past or who 
they would call if they had an emergency today. Rather, nine of the fourteen participants said 
that they would call the government service and the four who mentioned private services in 
response to these questions named three of the biggest services in the business: ER24, 
Netcare911, and Citimed.3 
 
																																																								
3 Only thirteen of the fourteen participants said that they would call an ambulance at all. As noted earlier, 
Participant 3 said that she would not call because she could not afford a private ambulance and did not 
trust government ambulances. Instead, she would ask a friend or neighbor for a ride (2016). 
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How Can We Improve? 
 Participants generally agreed that in order to improve EMRS in the long run, response 
times would have to be improved, which would inevitably mean devoting more resources to the 
government service. As Participant 5 said, “They need to be better resourced, better equipped, 
better funded, because that’s where the problem is. Because they’re completely overwhelmed, 
and there’s just too much to do” (2016). Participant 1 agreed, saying, “Response times would be 
the one thing that would better their service. It all depends once again on manpower, 
infrastructure, and vehicles.” However, like many participants, he also expressed doubt as to how 
conceivable this was, asking, “They’re getting the vehicles and the infrastructure back and 
starting to get the manpower, but with a growing population are we ever going to have enough 
vehicles?” (2016). 
 Another policy fix often came up when discussing potential ways to improve the 
ambulance system: enforcing already-existing regulation of the private ambulance industry, 
especially involving the smaller “fly-by-night” companies. However, participants were skeptical 
of this plan as well. Participant 5 laid out his concerns below: 
The regulating is the first step. Because if you look at the new regulations, there’s a minimum 
standard. They have to have a base; they have to have a wash bay with proper plumbing so you 
can clean bloody ambulances and stuff like that. And that, in theory, should rule out a lot of the 
smaller private services. But none of this is in effect. And then once it is, who’s going to police 
that? They’ll find a way around it. – Participant 5, 2016 
 
 Participant 1 also favored enforcing regulation but had similar worries about how this 
would look in practice: 
In terms of regulating, you’re going have to get a team to regulate it correctly that are not going 
be biased in any way, and that are not going to take bribes. That’s what’s going to happen. People 
are going try and give you bribes… I would say you have to find old school paramedics who are 
still passionate about the job and passionate about how they do it. And they need to go from base 
to base to base and make sure that everything is in place. And that’s the only way you can cut 
down and stop those services. Tell them that they can’t operate. And that’s the only way it could 
get done. And I feel that then you would see better patient care, better treatment, and better 
response times. – Participant 1, 2016 
 
However, not all participants favored enforcing these regulations in the first place, at 
least not to the point of shutting smaller services down. Participant 2, when asked about the issue, 
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reiterated his earlier argument about how the small services were critical to the townships (2016). 
He also added: 
It would be a big blow for the government itself because at the moment the government can’t 
reach most of the townships and rural areas. There’s still a lack of services. So imagine if they 
just come down and cut us off! A lot of people would die… They can’t just come and make the 
rules. You need to make me understand. You need to make sure that you guide us because they 
need our assistance. – Participant 2, 2016 
 
Participant 8, who works for a smaller service, assumed a stance somewhere between 
Participant 2 and the others. He generally agreed with Participant 2 on this point, saying, “There 
is definitely a place for smaller services, they can definitely be helpful” (2016). However, he also 
favored some degree of stiffer regulation, adding, “They probably do need to be monitored a 
little more. I mean, scooping eight or ten people into an ambulance? There’s really no place for 
that” (2016). 
I also asked participants about concrete changes that the national government is 
attempting to implement in order to improve the emergency medical system, such as the EMS-
related provisions of the NHI and the Minister of Health’s recent announcement of plans for one 
centralized ambulance call center. Like the previous policy proposals, their responses were 
decidedly mixed. On the one hand, some participants were optimistic, such as Participant 7, who 
felt that while “it would take a really long time,” these proposals ultimately would improve 
overall response times and quality of care across the board (2016). Participant 9, a paramedic for 
ER24, agreed, citing the unified call center that he worked under while in the Western Cape:  
We had that in Cape Town, where we had one of [ER24’s] dispatchers in the [government] 
dispatch room. So when there was a call from a medical aid patient, we would get it from them 
and we could send our ambulance out. If they use just one control center, that’ll work for when 
the government is running most of the calls in one place. Then you can have one emergency 
number. – Participant 9, 2016 
 
Interestingly, Participant 6 also cited the Western Cape system when asked about the unified call 
center proposal, saying, “That’s what we do in the Western Cape, we’ve got [private 
representatives] in the call center, and that’s how we work. [The government and private 
services] piggyback off one another and it works” (2016). 
However, not everyone believed that these proposals would be effective. Participant 5 
claimed that it would work in an ideal world, but:  
That will be tied down, mark my words. I mean, if that happens it’ll affect everyone’s bottom line, 
including Netcare and ER24. They’ll never let it go through, never. That bit of legislation will be 
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tied up in court for years… And I don’t think we’ll be seeing [NHI] in more than a pilot phase 
any time in the near future, certainly not in the next five years. –Participant 5, 2016 
 
Perhaps most harshly, Participant 1 agreed, citing corruption and the political system as major 
roadblocks before even thinking about NHI, saying, “We’re a third world country. It’s going to 
take a very long time. I think once the government is sorted out then we can take a look at NHI. I 




  The data gathered is merely the opinions and experiences of twenty-three individuals, 
each with their particular backgrounds and biases. Any conclusions drawn from this data may 
have been influenced by the limitations listed earlier. With that being said, there are several 
different themes and issues observed in the interviews and survey responses that should be 
explored. 
 
The State of Durban Emergency Medical Services 
A Substantial Gap Between Policy and Practice 
Participants universally described a public emergency medical system that diverged 
significantly from the stated government policy, providing an inferior level of care to what 
official standards require, particularly regarding ambulance response times. This description 
was consistent with the literature. For example, in the literature, Durban paramedics reported 
frequently reaching the scene well after the patient’s family got frustrated and took them to 
the hospital via other means. Survey respondents described the same story, albeit from the 
perspective of the patient; they often reported that the last time they called an ambulance it 
never came, or that they had to get a neighbor to take them because the ambulance was 
taking too long (Wick and Hlongwane, 2013, n.p.). This reality is a far cry from the fifteen-
minute national standard for ambulance response times in urban areas (SAHRC, 2015, p. 27).  
When asked about private ambulance services, participants again described a reality 
that contrasted heavily with stated government policy and regulation; while the national 
government has passed regulations in order to ensure that all private ambulance services 
uphold a certain standard of care, this very clearly is not the case in practice. Even Participant 
2, who owns his own small ambulance company and passionately defended their place in the 
health care system, admitted that if the government were to enforce the stated regulation 
immediately, many, if not all, of these small companies would be shut down (2016). It also 
seems that this practically unregulated system serves as a detriment to patient care and puts 
patients’ lives at risk at least some of the time. This statement is particularly true in light of 
the low-quality and outright dangerous care that many interviewees reported was delivered 
by these small companies, especially involving traffic accidents. 
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 Urban Areas Versus Townships 
One worrying development concerning the distribution of government care that 
became apparent throughout the study is the extent to which participants felt that EMRS is 
worse in the townships than in Durban itself. Although the city-versus-township divide was 
not well fleshed out in the literature, participants almost unanimously agreed upon it; most 
EMS professionals interviewed described much longer wait times in townships than in 
Durban itself, and some Cato Manor residents even told of ambulances not arriving at all. 
This divide is of particular concern because townships like Cato Manor are generally 
characterized by lower-income residents and thus have fewer people with medical aid than 
wealthier areas do, not to mention fewer individuals with access to personal transportation 
that can bring them directly to the hospital (Sekhampu, 2013, p. 147). As Participant 2 said, 
“those people who stay in [the city] have transport! They have vehicles; they have relatives. 
Those people in the township really need the ambulances, because they’ve got no transport” 
(2016). That is, in the situation described by participants, the people who need EMRS the 
most are also the ones who are most neglected.  
Although the extent to which practice deviated from policy in the public sector clearly 
impairs the health of those in township communities in the form of low-quality EMRS care, 
it is difficult so say how these communities are affected by the same gap in regulating the 
private sector. Participant 2 argued that the lack of regulation, in fact, helps townships, 
saying that smaller companies like his, which are only allowed to exist due to the lack of 
regulation, are critical in serving the neglected and poorer areas around Durban (2016). 
However, this was hardly a consensus opinion, as other participants disagreed and said that 
smaller private services are generally even less likely to serve townships than the more 
legitimate larger companies (Participant 1, 2016; Participant 5, 2016; Participant 6, 2016). In 
addition, the survey of Cato Manor, intended to gather further evidence to explore Participant 
2’s claim, did not find evidence of community members using smaller services. Instead, it 
found quite the opposite: when survey respondents needed an ambulance, those without 
medical aid would generally call EMRS and the few with medical aid would call the large 
private services. This absence of evidence does not mean that Participant 2 is lying in his 
claims. However, it does mean that his claims are perhaps somewhat exaggerated; while his 
	 29	
company may serve a low-income township community, some townships are still served 
primarily by the government and the larger services, and some small companies seem to 
mostly make their money off already-oversaturated traffic accidents rather than serving 
communities. Thus, the lack of regulation may not help Cato Manor and possibly other 
township communities as much as he believes.  
 
A Combination of Common and Unique Challenges  
To some extent, the lackluster public system described is just a harsh reality of life in 
a country with a stagnant economy and a world with limited resources. After all, as both the 
literature and several participants identified, the long response times are fundamentally due 
to a shortage of resources within EMRS and a lack of immediate funds to supply more 
resources. This aspect calls to mind a story about Elliott Richardson, a former United States 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who in 1972 discovered that his new nutrition 
program would only reach 5% of eligible citizens. When he asked how much it would cost to 
expand all his department’s programs to reach everyone eligible, the answer came back as 
$250 billion—more than the budget of the entire federal government at the time. Reflecting 
on this episode, he concluded that all too often government programs “merely publicize a 
need without creating either the means or the resources for meeting it,” a quote that also rings 
true in the context of all the complaints that citizens have about EMRS (Fesler and Kettl, 
1991, p. 372).  
It is also worth mentioning the particular difficulties of establishing a robust public 
emergency medical system in South Africa, and even more specifically within KZN. 
Participant 5, when reflecting on the system, said, “When the apartheid government was only 
catering to white people, there was a very efficient state ambulance service. All the best staff 
worked there; they had all the resources. And now, because they have to cater to the whole 
population, obviously there’s a massive gap” (2016). That is, while the apartheid government 
could devote almost all of its EMS resources to catering for a tiny subset of the population, 
apartheid’s end in 1994 meant immediately expanding the government’s scope of care 
exponentially to include the entire population. This adjustment has potential to be 
particularly challenging in KZN, which is the second largest province population-wise and 
has “lots of areas which are extremely remote… where ambulances have to do primary 
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emergency calls that are in excess of 250 kilometers” (Statistics South Africa, 2016, p. 2; 
Participant 5, 2016). Given this context and the recency of apartheid’s end, the poor modern 
care described by all the participants becomes slightly more understandable, though such an 
understanding, of course, does not diminish the unacceptable realities. 
 
The Hybrid Governance Model  
Durban Emergency Medical Services as Hybrid Governance 
The coexistent relationship described by participants between the public sector and 
private ambulance companies is not unique to South Africa but instead fits well into the 
already-existing theoretical framework on public policy and non-state forces, particularly 
within Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, one common definition of the state is “an 
organization that can provide public goods—goods in which one additional recipient of the 
good does not reduce the availability of the good” (Kalow, 2015, p. 11). EMS certainly falls 
under this definition of public goods, and thus would traditionally be the domain of the state. 
However, as Kalow writes, in the context of post-colonial Africa, where the formal 
government is not always able to adequately provide public goods, non-government actors 
have increasingly been critical in providing these services. This dynamic forms what is often 
referred to as hybrid governance (Kalow, 2015, p. 18). While most of the literature on the 
issue focuses on the efforts of nonprofit organizations, this can apply to for-profit groups 
such as private ambulance companies as well. This background also gives a theoretical basis 
to explain the rise in these private companies: because EMRS is unable to provide the public 
good of emergency care at a universally acceptable level, the private services have stepped in 
to fill this gap in the market. Indeed, as Participant 6, who works for ER24, wryly noted, “If 
the Minister of Health bettered his service, our service would go out of business” (2016). In 
other words, the private services solely exist because the formal state lacks the ability to 
improve public sector EMS.  
  
Challenges of Hybrid Governance 
Literature and past research on these interactions between government and third party 
actors also account for some of the difficulties that participants described with private EMS 
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in Durban. As Fesler and Kettl wrote of the government working together with NGOs and the 
private sector: 
The fundamental problem is that different organizations have different purposes, and people 
who work for them naturally pursue different goals. Whenever the government relies on a 
proxy to produce a service, it faces the task of trying to impose its aims on the very different 
objectives of the proxy. The least that can result from such a process is conflict; the most, a 
deflection of the government’s goals towards those of its proxy (Fesler and Kettl, 1991, 376).  
 
Others in the field of policy implementation agree. Lester Salamon writes, “When principals 
and agents lack a shared set of values or worldviews, the task of ensuring that the principal’s 
objectives are being served grows more complex and more problematic” (2000, p. 1661). 
While these were written about the United States, similar issues have been found to exist 
within an African context (Mburu, 1989, p. 597). 
In summation, because the formal South African government is relying partially on 
private agents to provide the public good of EMS, it must contend with the private sector’s 
ultimate objective of making money. These issues are especially prominent in the case of 
South African EMS because, as Salamon predicted, sometimes this monetary objective in 
fact directly conflicts with the government objective of providing emergency medical care 
for all. For example, when a patient without medical aid calls a private service, following the 
government’s goals would dictate that they should be treated no differently, but because the 
patient offers little financial incentive to the private company, ambulances for non-medical 
aid patients often arrive slower, if they arrive at all. And when there is a car accident with 
many victims and thus many potential RAF payouts, following the government’s goals 
would dictate that different private services should work together and give everyone high-
quality care, but because an accident site is financially lucrative for private services, accident 




Devoting more resources and money to EMRS would almost certainly improve many 
of the issues described above. As participants argued, with more ambulances and better 
equipment, the government service would be able to get to emergency scenes more quickly 
and be able to provide a higher level of care once they reached the patient. With this 
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improved government service, not only would lower-income communities be better served, 
but this problem of regulation and conflicting objectives between public and private sectors 
would also lessen. However, most participants also had very little hope for this solution, and 
with good reason: to meet the standard of one ambulance per every 10,000 people, KZN 
would have to quintuple its current ambulance fleet, which seems quite unlikely to happen in 
the near future (Wicks and Hlongwane, 2013, n.p.). Policy literature also expressed this 
concern, as most analysts agree that one significant disadvantage of formal government 
providing services without any assistance by third parties is that it is far more expensive than 
contracting or allowing the third parties to operate independently (Fesler and Kettl, 1991, p. 
387). 
 
Regulation Within Reason 
Whether or not the government service is able to improve its response times, a clear 
imperative commonly discussed by participants for improving EMS in the area is to enforce 
the already-existing regulations on the private services to bring their actions more in line with 
government objectives; that is, to reduce the number of cases of poor care delivered to car 
crash victims or patients without medical aid. However, after interviews, it is more difficult 
to determine the strictness with which these regulations should be carried out. After all, while 
employees of larger companies endorsed strict regulation to reign in smaller companies that 
they perceived to be dangerous, those who worked for those smaller companies felt quite 
differently. They passionately argued that regulation and threatening smaller companies was 
a terrible idea. In other words, every interviewee employed by the industry argued for the 
policy outcome that would ultimately be most advantageous for his or her employer. One 
possible manner of reconciling these very different perspectives is the concept that neither 
side is entirely correct. Perhaps while many small companies do in fact primarily make their 
money off road accidents and deliver dangerously low levels of care, others actually do work 
within their communities and provide a valuable service. If this is indeed the case, any 
enforcement of government regulation might be best suited to act carefully and avoid overly 
broad strokes. While ending practices like loading ten patients in an ambulance at a crash 
scene is surely desirable, shutting down a service that exists as an affordable and acceptable 
alternative within a township community is not.  
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The literature also endorses this type of discretion in enforcing regulation, claiming:  
Regulatory enforcement may actually be more successful if it promotes the concept of the 
‘good inspector,’ the inspector who understands when forbearance rather than rigid 
enforcement will best enforce regulatory compliance, and who has the discretion to adjust 
regulatory enforcement accordingly (Fesler and Kettl, 1991, p. 1639).  
 
In the context of South African EMS, this “good inspector” sounds much like what 
Participant 2 described: someone who can stand up to companies truly engaging in malicious 
practices, but who can “make me understand” the rules and exercise discretion with smaller 
services that actually are helping serve their communities (2016). 
 
A Unified Call Center? 
These regulations could exist in conjunction with the unified call center already 
planned by the Department of Health, in which there would only be one emergency number 
for all ambulance services. When a medical aid patient calls, the patient could then be co-
opted into care by whichever private service was closest and best equipped to deal with the 
patient (Stolley, 2016, n.p.). This, in effect, would be embracing the model of hybrid 
governance, and not without good reason: despite the problems laid out earlier, collaboration 
between the private and public sectors to deliver public goods is not necessarily a bad 
concept, and is in fact a common phenomenon in policy implementation (Salamon, 2000, p. 
1613; Meagher, 2012, p. 1073). This collaboration has many advantages, such as lowered 
costs for the government and increased flexibility in that private companies do not have to 
worry about government red tape (Fesler and Kettl, 1991, p. 388). Fortunately, in addition to 
the theoretical basis, there is also a practical framework for how this system could work, 
namely the system already in place in the Western Cape, which many participants cited as 
highly functional.  
 
Of course, this does not mean that implementation of the call center, or any of these 
plans, will be straightforward. Some participants expressed skepticism, citing government 
corruption and a lack of cooperation on the part of the private sector as potential roadblocks. 
But, without a sudden infusion of resources into EMRS, regulating and collaborating with the 
private sector may be a viable way forward in working towards the goal of improving the 
emergency medical system. 
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Conclusions 
The government-run EMS in Durban performs at a level far inferior to what is required 
by the national policy standards and the needs of the people, particularly concerning ambulance 
response times. Because the government is unable to provide EMS at a level acceptable to much 
of the population, the private sector has stepped into the gap in the market; as many as forty 
private ambulance companies now operate in Durban. The presence of the private companies 
creates a situation of hybrid governance, where the third party groups of the private sector are 
providing the public good of emergency services to a portion of the public. However, even 
within the private sector, there are issues with the level of care provided, particularly involving 
smaller so-called “fly-by-night” ambulance companies. This issue again highlights the disparity 
between policy and practice; while the government has passed strict regulations in order to 
uphold a minimum level of care among the private companies, participants unanimously reported 
that these regulations are in no way enforced.  
Participants discussed many possible solutions to the fundamental problem of poor 
service, including devoting more money and resources to the government service, enforcing 
regulation of the private services, and the proposed unified call center for both private and 
government services. While there is some reason for optimism that these fixes could improve the 
service, there are also many pitfalls such as corruption and a lack of cooperation on the part of 
the private sector. Ultimately, until the service is improved, citizens of Durban and the 
surrounding area will have to live with the fear and uncertainty of not knowing what kind of care 
they will receive the next time they call for an ambulance, and the ANC’s promise of emergency 
care for all communities will go unfulfilled.  
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Recommendations for Further Study 
This study takes only a brief look at the general state of emergency medical services in 
Durban and could be improved or expanded upon in a number of ways.  
One critical manner to improve on this research would be to broaden its sample size. 
Because of time constraints, I was only able to conduct nine interviews with professionals 
involved in EMS, and survey fourteen members of the Cato Manor community. A study 
involving more professionals could perhaps bring in different opinions and lend further depth to 
the analysis. This further research would be particularly valuable if more interviews were 
conducted with employees of small “fly-by-night” companies or with government employees, as 
I had particular difficulty accessing these groups. Of course, any study involving EMRS 
employees would have to adhere to SIT’s Human Subjects Research Policy and take the utmost 
care to protect the anonymity of the subjects. 
Expanding the research to include the opinions and beliefs of citizens in different 
townships outside of Cato Manor would also be beneficial. While the survey in Cato Manor was 
intended to explore Participant 2’s claim that smaller ambulance companies were integral to 
serving the townships, the conclusions that could be drawn from this survey were limited, as that 
the survey was conducted within one small community of one township, rather than 
encompassing many neighborhoods in many townships. 
Several participants suggested that I ride along with various private ambulance 
companies in order to observe the described issues for myself. I did not do this for practical and 
ethical reasons, as I am not qualified to deliver medical care and ethically could not include these 
observations in my study. However, this could be a potentially very useful method of gathering 
data for future researchers, as they could see for themselves what happens when a non-medical 
aid patient calls and how patients are treated at accident sites. Of course, anyone interested in 
pursuing this path would have to be very careful to uphold ethical standards concerning doing 
research in a medical setting.  
Some participants mentioned the manner in which small private services often assist the 
government or larger private services in calls that the larger services do not think they will be 
able to reach. This practice did not appear to significantly affect EMRS response times and was 
not reported to be a major part of smaller companies’ business, and thus was beyond the scope of 
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this study. However, the nature and extent of these interactions could potentially be a very 
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Appendix 1: Sample Interview Guide 
Introduction 
1. Just to give you some context, I am an American university student spending a semester 
studying in Durban. As the capstone for my program, we spend four weeks on a project, 
basically writing a long paper on an issue that we want to learn about. My issue is 
emergency medical services in KwaZulu-Natal and how they can be improved. 
2. What is your name, age, and occupation? 
3. How long have you been doing this for? 
 
Assessing the System 
4. What are your average response times, from the moment that a person calls to the 
moment that you arrive? 
5. How do these compare to the average response times of the government service? 
a. In Durban? 
b. In more rural parts of the country? 
6. What is the biggest barrier to improving response times?  
7. In your experience, to what extent are equipment issues and a shortage of resources a 
problem for your ambulance services? What about government ambulance services? 
8. How much of an issue are smaller “fly-by-night” ambulance companies? 
9. Do you think that the system you’re describing is acceptable for a country only 22 years 
into democracy? 
 
Policy and Improvement 
10. So let’s talk about how EMS can be improved… Which of these specific issues do you 
think the government most needs to prioritize in improving EMS? (e.g. response times, 
equipment issues) 
11. How do you think they should go about improving this issue? 
12. Are you familiar with the National Health Insurance plan and the portion of it on EMS? If 
so, do you think that its provisions will help substantially improve the system? 
13. Do you have any hope that EMS will be improved in the coming years, or do you feel as 
the situation is at more of a standstill? 
 
Conclusion 
14. Is there anything else that you want to add? 
15. Is there anything you want to ask me? 
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Appendix 2: Survey 
 
 
  Please circle your response to the following questions.  
1. What is your age? ______________   Male / Female  
2. Do you have medical aid?     Yes / No 
3. Have you ever called an ambulance?  Yes / No 
(Please only answer questions 4 - 7 if you answered, “Yes” to question 3) 
4. If you have called an ambulance, what service did you call?  
 




     6.  About how long did the ambulance take to get to you? ___________________ 
     7. Do you think the ambulance service was good? 
 
 




9. Why would you call that ambulance service? 
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11. Who do you think provides the BEST ambulance service? (please circle) 
Government Ambulance Service   
Private Ambulances (Please specify which company) ________________________ 
 





13. Who do you think provides the WORST ambulance service? (please circle) 
Government Ambulance Service   
Private Ambulances (Please specify which company) ________________________ 
 
14. Why do you think they are they the worst? 
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Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance Form 
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